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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this Court arises under sections 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) of
the Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE #1: Did Judge Peuler properly rule that pursuant to Utah's
Recording Act, Metro West is the rightful owner of the property at issue because
Metro West purchased the property in good faith and for valuable consideration and
properly recorded its interest in the Utah County Recorder's Office nearly a decade
before Salt Lake County recorded its purported interest?
ISSUE #2: Is Metro West the rightful owner of the property at issue on the
alternative ground of adverse possession where Metro West paid all taxes on the
property and possessed and openly and exclusively used the property for a
continuous period in excess of seven years?
A trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment is a question of law
reviewed for correctness. Rawson v. Conover. 20 P.2d 876 (Utah 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1989, Metro West Ready Mix, Inc. ("Metro West"), through its
predecessor in interest, paid valuable consideration to purchase a parcel of real
property located entirely in Utah County on the west side of 1-15 near the point of
the mountain. The property's northern border is the Utah County/Salt Lake County
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line and its western border is the Rio Grande Railroad. The remainder of the
property is bordered by Metro West's gravel pit operation. Immediately after it
purchased the property in 1989, Metro West recorded its deed in the Utah County
Recorder's Office. From that time forward, Metro West paid all taxes assessed on
the property, and continually and openly used the property as part of its gravel pit
operation. This property has been referred to in this case as "Parcel G" and this
case is about the ownership of Parcel G.
In 1999, Salt Lake County (the "County") filed this lawsuit, claiming that it
owned Parcel G pursuant to an 1878 deed. The County failed to record its
purported deed to Parcel G in the Utah County Recorder's Office until 1998, more
than nine years after Metro West recorded its deed and over 120 years after the
County claims it obtained the deed. Until 1998, there was no indication on the
property or in the Utah County Recorder's Office that the County had any
ownership interest in Parcel G. Metro West had the only properly recorded deed to
Parcel G; it alone paid all taxes assessed on Parcel G; and it openly, continuously
and exclusively used Parcel G as part of its gravel pit operation for nearly a decade.
In response to the County's lawsuit, Metro West filed a motion for summary
judgment asserting that it was the rightful owner of Parcel G pursuant to Utah's
Recording Act and, alternatively, on the basis of adverse possession. On February
26,2001, the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler granted Metro West's Motion pursuant to
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the Recording Act and therefore did not reach the issue of adverse possession. [R.
at296-97.]
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Metro West set forth several
numbered paragraphs of undisputed fact. [R. at 83-86.] The County did not dispute
any of Metro West's facts as required by Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration and the facts were therefor "deemed admitted for the
purpose of summary judgment." Id. The same facts are set forth herein, in relevant
part, with citations to the record.
1.

Metro West, through its predecessor in interest, Lamona Farms,

purchased Parcel G from Dahrl and Roena Tingey on April 14,1989 for
approximately $25,000 and then promptly recorded its deed to parcel G in the Utah
County Recorder's Office. [R. at 97-100,106, 127.] Parcel G is located entirely in
Utah County. [R. at 127.]
2.

During negotiations to purchase Parcel G, the Tingeys represented to

the owners of Lamona Farms, Dr. Paul Richards and Dr. David Nelson, that the
Tingey family had owned Parcel G since the turn of the century. [R. at 102,10405.]
3.

Lamona Farms purchased and recorded its interest in Parcel G with the

assistance of a title company. The title company reviewed Parcel G and reported to
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Lamona Farms that there were no conflicts with the Tingey's ownership of Parcel
G. [R. at 102-03.] Dr. Richards and Dr. Nelson also personally reviewed records
obtained from the Utah County Recorder's Office and determined that there were
no conflicts with respect to the Tingey's representations regarding their
longstanding ownership of Parcel G. [R. at 100-01.]
4.

In April 1991, all of the property Lamona Farms had acquired at the

point of the mountain, including Parcel G, was transferred by deed from Lamona
Farms to Monterra Rock Products, Inc. [R. at 106, 128-30.] In 1993, Monterra
Rock merged into Metro West. [R. at 107-08.] Neither Lamona Farms, Monterra
Rock, nor Metro West had any knowledge whatsoever of the County's claimed
ownership interest in Parcel G prior to June 1998. [R. at 119-20.]
5.

The County did not record its deed to Parcel G in the Utah County

Recorder's Office until June 1998, more than 120 years after it purportedly acquired
the property. [R. at 131,133, 138-40.]
6.

Prior to the County's recording of its purported deed in June 1998,

there was no indication of any kind in the Utah County Recorder's Office that the
County claimed any ownership interest in Parcel G. [R. at 141-43.]
7.

Between 1990 and 1998, the County did not perform any activity on

Parcel G. The County has never posted any sign or given any other indication on
Parcel G evidencing its purported ownership of the property. [R. at 136-37.] In
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fact, the County is unaware of whether any of its employees or agents ever set foot
on Parcel G at anytime between 1990 and June 1998. [R. at 134-35.]
8.

From the time it acquired Parcel G in 1989, Metro West (and its

predecessors in interest), exclusively, continuously and openly used the property as
part of Metro West's gravel pit operation. Metro West began excavating and
drilling holes on Parcel G in 1990 and conducting sampling testing of the
underground materials. To perform this work, Metro West bulldozed rough roads
into the property, enlarged existing roads, and repeatedly took heavy drilling and
excavating equipment onto the property. This and other activity on Parcel G
occurred regularly over the next several years. [R. at 108-13, 116-18,121-26.]
9.

At the point of the mountain where Parcel G is located, there are

numerous operating gravel pits. Parcel G is substantially bordered by the remainder
of Metro West's gravel pit and is generally surrounded by other gravel mining
operations. At all relevant times, the only vehicle access to parcel G was through
Metro West's gravel pit operation where Metro West had numerous signs indicating
its ownership of the gravel pit. [R. at 145-47.]
10.

Metro West and its predecessors in interest paid all taxes assessed on

Parcel G each year from 1990 through 1999. [R. at 114-15,145-57.]
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RESPONSE TO THE COUNTY'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
In its fact statement, the County infers that the boundary line between Utah
County and Salt Lake County was not established until after the County acquired
its purported interest in Parcel G and that this somehow caused the County's
failure to record its deed in the Utah County Recorder's Office. [Appellant's Brief
at 4-5.] This is false. At all relevant times, Parcel G has been located entirely in
Utah County. The boundary line between Utah County and Salt Lake County was
established, at the latest, in 1876 and has remained the same through today.
Chapter III, Section 10 of the Compiled Laws of the Territory of Utah, dated 1876,
provides a detailed description of the county boundaries existing at that time, and
reads, in relevant part, as follows:
(152.) Sec. 10. All that portion of the Territory bounded south by
Juab and Sanpete Counties, west by the summit of the range between
Cedar and Rush Valleys, north by the summit of the cross range
between the Oquirrh and Wasatch Mountains . . . is hereby made
and named Utah County, with County Seat at Provo.
[R. at 275-77, emphasis added.]
Section 17-50-229 of the Utah Code, dated 2000, describes the current
"geographic boundaries of Utah County", and provides that the boundary between
Utah County and Salt Lake County is "the point of intersection of the Wasatch
Range with the summit of the range crossing from the Wasatch to the Oquirrh
Mountains" [R. at278-79, emphasis added.]
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As these statutes unambiguously provide, the northern border of Utah
County, which is the boundary between Utah County and Salt Lake County, has
remained unchanged since 1876. At all relevant times, Parcel G has been located
in Utah County and it is undisputed that the County did not file its purported
interest in Parcel G in the Utah County Recorder's Office until 1998.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Judge Peuler correctly ruled that Metro West is the rightful owner of Parcel
G. Metro West purchased Parcel G in good faith and for fair market value; it duly
recorded its deed with the Utah County Recorder's Office; it paid all taxes assessed
on Parcel G; and it used the property openly and continuously as part of its gravel
pit operations. The County, on the other hand, failed to record its purported deed to
Parcel G in the Utah County Recorder's Office until nearly nine years after Metro
West recorded its deed and over 120 years after the County purportedly obtained
title to Parcel G. From 1989 to 1998, the County failed to use the property in any
manner; failed to post any notice or indication of its purported ownership on the
property, and failed to give Metro West any indication whatsoever that the County
claimed ownership of Parcel G.
Utah is a race-notice state and under well-settled Utah law, the burden is on a
property owner to record its deed in the county in which the property is located. If
another party subsequently purchases the property for valuable consideration and
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without notice of any competing interest and records its deed prior to the first party
recording its deed, Utah law plainly holds that the first party's deed is void as to the
subsequent purchaser and the property belongs to the subsequent purchaser. That is
precisely what occurred in this case. As Judge Peuler found, Metro West purchased
Parcel G in good faith, for valuable consideration and without knowledge of the
County's purported ownership interest and then recorded its deed in the Utah
County Recorder's Office nearly a decade before the County recorded its purported
deed. Under Utah law, Metro West is the owner of Parcel G.
Even if this Court were to hold that Utah's Recording Act somehow did not
apply in this case, it should nevertheless uphold Judge Peuler's grant of summary
judgment in Metro West's favor on the alternative ground that Metro West is the
rightful owner of Parcel G pursuant to the doctrine of adverse possession. The
parties fully briefed and argued this issue to the Trial Court. Metro West
purchased Parcel G nearly ten years prior to receiving any notice of the County's
purported interest. Upon purchase, Metro West duly recorded its deed in the Utah
County Recorder's Office, paid all assessed taxes on Parcel G, and openly used
Parcel G as a part of its ongoing gravel pit operation. Because the statutory
elements of adverse possession are met in this case, Metro West is the owner of
Parcel G.
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The recording requirements and the doctrine of adverse possession are well
established in Utah. The County, as a substantial property owner, an assessor of
property taxes, and an entity specifically charged with preserving, cataloging, and
controlling documents reflecting property rights and ownership in the state of
Utah, is acutely aware of these statutes and of its obligation to properly record its
own property. In this case, the County failed for over 120 years to properly record
its purported ownership of Parcel G. The County should not be rewarded for its
failure by obtaining a significant and entirely serendipitous windfall from the
efforts of Metro West in mining and cultivating Parcel G over the past decade.
Likewise, Metro West should not be harshly and inequitably penalized because of
the County's admitted failure to comply with clear, statutory recording
requirements.
Judge Peuler properly granted summary judgment in Metro West's favor and
this Court should uphold that ruling on appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

JUDGE PEULER PROPERLY HELD THAT UTAH'S RECORDING
ACT APPLIES IN THIS CASE.
Utah's Recording Act is found in Utah Code Annotated, Section 57-3-103,

and reads, in relevant part, as follows:
Effect of Failure to Record.
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Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as
against any subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any
portion of it, if:
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good
faith and for a valuable consideration; and
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the purpose of Utah's
Recording Act is to "protect the purchaser's interest" against the asserted but
unrecorded interest of a third party. Horman v. Clark. 744 P.2d 1014,1016 (Ut.
Ct. App. 1987) (internal citations omitted); see also Johnson v. Higlev. 989 P.2d
61, 70 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999) ("[t]he recording statute's purpose is to provide a
method by which a transferee can protect himself from intervening claimants")
(internal quotations omitted). Thus, "an innocent purchaser, having no notice of
liens or adverse claims not disclosed by the records in the manner prescribed by
the statute, will hold land as against such claims and liens." Johnson. 989 P.2d at
70 (citing 66 Am. Jur.2d Records and Recording Laws § 48 (1973)).
In this case, the Trial Court applied Utah's Recording Act and concluded,
based on the Recording Act's plain language and the undisputed facts that Metro
West was the rightful owner of Parcel G. [R. at 296-97.] The County now claims
that Utah's Recording Act should not apply in this case 1) because Metro West did
not have what the County refers to as "good chain of title" to Parcel G and 2)
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because Metro West acquired Parcel G by quitclaim deed. As set forth below, the
County is incorrect and its arguments are not supported by law or fact. Utah's
Recording Act applies in this case and this Court should uphold the Trial Court's
grant of summary judgment in Metro West's favor.
A.

Utah's Recording Act Does Not Have a "Good Chain of Title"
Requirement.

The County alleges that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
in Metro West's favor because Metro West failed to establish "good chain of title"
to Parcel G. [Appellant's Brief at 12-13.] In support of this argument, the County
asserts, with no citation whatsoever to the language of Utah's Recording Act or
case law, that the Recording Act only protects a purchaser of land if the purchaser
can establish a direct chain of title to the land. In essence, the County claims that
the Recording Act only applies when both parties claiming title to a parcel of land
can each establish "good chain of title" to that same land. The County's argument
is nonsensical. It would be impossible, as the County suggests, for two parties to
have competing, mutually exclusive claims to the same property yet both possess
"good chain of title."
Moreover, as set forth below, the County's argument simply misinterprets
the purpose and focus of Utah's Recording Act. Rather than focus on the grantor's
title or lack thereof as the County seemingly claims, the purpose of the Recording
Act is to protect bona fide purchasers of real property who purchase in "good
11

faith" and for "valuable consideration." Utah Code Annotated, Section 57-3-103.
The Utah Supreme Court in Pender v. Bird, 224 P.2d 1057, 1069 (Utah 1950),
explicitly stated that the purpose of the Recording Act "is to protect the man who
honestly believes he is acquiring a good title and who invests some substantial sum
in reliance on that belief." And as this Court held in Horman v. Clark. 744 P.2d
1014,1016 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987), Utah's Recording Act was enacted to protect a
good faith purchaser who pays valuable consideration for a property who has no
notice of any defects in his grantor's title including any competing interests.1
Although Utah Courts have not addressed a case with facts similar to the
present case, courtsfromjurisdictions with similar recording acts have addressed
such cases and have clearly rejected the argument the County is attempting to
make in this case.
In Roberts v. Purslev, 718 A.2d 837 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998), the Pursleys
brought an ejectment action against the Roberts. At trial, the Pursleys established
their "good chain of title" to the property, dating back to the original 1854 warrant.
Id. at 840. The Roberts, however, could not establish their title prior to 1901, due
1

Comment 1 to Connecticut's Recording Act, which is similar to Utah's Recording
Act, makes clear that the focus should not be on the grantor's actual title but rather
on the title that the purchaser believes in good faith he is receiving from the
grantor: "[T]he rights acquired by a bona fide purchaser or judgment lien creditor,
without notice of an unrecorded interest, are not determined by the actual title of
the grantor, but rather by his apparent title." Comment 1, Connecticut's Standards
of Title, Standard 2.7.
12

to an ineffective conveyance that had occurred at that time. Id The trial court
found that the Roberts could not, therefore, establish "good chain of title."
The trial court then focused on when the parties had recorded their deeds to
the property. The party that sold the property to the Roberts had duly recorded its
deed to the property in 1964. The Pursley's predecessors in interest, however, did
not record any interest in the property until 1967, nearly 113 years after the
original warrant and 3 years after the Roberts' predecessor-in-interest had recorded
its deed. The trial court found, pursuant to Pennsylvania's recording statute and
despite its finding that the Roberts failed to prove "their predecessors ever acquired
title to the [property]," that because the Roberts' predecessor-in-interest recorded
its interest in the property prior to the Pursleys' predecessors-in-interest recording
its interest, the Roberts held valid title to the property. See id.
On Appeal, the Pursleys argued, similar to the County's argument in this
case, that Pennsylvania's recording act should not apply because the Roberts'
grantor did not possess legal title. Id at 841. The Pennsylvania Superior Court
disagreed. The court initially found that "[t]he recording statute was intended to
protect bona fide purchasers who give value for land" and in order to qualify as a
bona fide purchaser under the act, "the subsequent buyer must be without notice of
a prior equitable interest." Id. The Court then flatly rejected the Pursleys'
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argument that the recording act does not apply where a party's grantor did not hold
legal title to the property in dispute. The Court held:
If "legal title," within the [Pursleys'] definition, were required for a
subsequent purchaser to qualify as a bona fide purchaser, the
recording statute would not further its intended goals. For instance, in
the typical recording statute situation, a grantor sells land to a grantee
who does not record the deed; then, a subsequent buyer purchases the
same land from the same grantor as the original grantee and this
subsequent grantee records his deed before the first grantee. This
subsequent grantee does not have "legal title" within the [Pursleys']
definition because at the time the land was sold to him, the grantor did
not have legal title to give such right. Yet, notwithstanding the fact
that he does not have "legal title," he is a bona fide purchaser if at the
time of the sale he was without notice of an adverse interest and value
was given for the purchase of the land.
Id. The Court concluded that acceptance of the Pursleys' argument that a
requirement of "legal title" should be imposed on the definition of a bona fide
purchaser "would nearly render the recording statute useless." Id The Court held
that the recording act did apply and that the Roberts held superior title to the
property over the Pursleys.
Likewise, in Alexander v. O'Neih 267 P.2d 730 (Ariz. 1954), the Arizona
Supreme Court found that an individual who, in good faith and for valuable
consideration, purchases land is entitled to the protection of a recording statute
despite the fact that the purchaser receives a quitclaim deed from a grantor who did
not have "good chain of title" to the land. In Alexander, a property owner, Solly,
deeded a parcel of property to Alexander in 1933. Alexander did not record his
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warranty deed to the property until nearly fifteen years later in 1948. In 1944,
Solly died naming his wife as the sole beneficiary of his will. Shortly after Solly's
death, his wife conveyed the same piece of property to a man named O'Neil by
quitclaim deed. O'Neil recorded his quitclaim deed with the proper county
recorder in 1946 - approximately two years prior to the time Alexander recorded
his deed to the same property in 1948. In January 1948, O'Neil conveyed a portion
of the property to the Northingtons by quitclaim deed. In 1949, Alexander brought
a quiet title action against O'Neil and the Northingtons.
The Court first affirmed judgment for the Northingtons, stating the
following:
Whether their grantor O'Neil was or was not a purchaser for value is
not material to their rights so long as they had no notice of defects in
their grantor's title, and did give value for the conveyance, which was
made to them prior to the recordation of the 1933 Solly-Alexander
deed. Furthermore, the fact that their deed from O'Neil was quitclaim
in form in nowise precludes them from asserting that they were bona
fide purchasers for a valuable consideration in good faith.
Id. at 733. Although the court never found that the Northingtons had "good chain
of title" to the property, the court held for the Northingtons pursuant to the
recording act because the Northingtons purchased the property in good faith and
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for valuable considerations and Alexander, who arguably held good chain of title,
had failed to properly record his interest. Id at 734-35.2
The same analysis applies in the present case. It is undisputed that Metro
West purchased Parcel G in 1989fromthe Tingeys for valuable consideration and
without notice of any defects in the Tingey's title and immediately thereafter
recorded its deed in the Utah County Recorder's Office. [R. at 127.] The County
did not properly record its deed to Parcel G until nearly a decade later. [R. at 131,
133, 138-40.] The County has not, and cannot, dispute that Metro West had no
notice whatsoever regarding the County's purported interest in the property or that
the Tingey's apparent title to Parcel G was anything other than what the Tingeys
represented to Metro West. [R. at 102-05,136-37,141-43.] As Judge Peuler
correctly ruled, as a bona fide purchaser of Parcel G, Metro West is entitled to the
protection of the Recording Act.
B.

The Fact that Metro West Acquired Parcel G by Quitclaim Deed
Has No Bearing On the Application of Utah's Recording Act.

The County next claims that Utah's Recording Act should not apply in this
case because Metro West acquired Parcel G by quitclaim deed. The County is
again incorrect. A grantee under a quitclaim deed is a bona fide purchaser and is
entitled to the full protection of the recording laws. Indeed, it is well-settled that
2

The Arizona Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of whether
O'Neil paid valuable consideration for the quitclaim deed he receivedfromMrs.
16

[w]hile the courts have expressed themselves to the effect that a
quitclaim deed passes no more than the grantor's present interest, this
expression has been used to state a general truth, and not as a
construction of the Recording Acts, and so far as concerns the rights
of a grantee under a quitclaim deed by virtue of the Recording Acts
the tendency of modern decisions is uniformly in favor of the rule
[that a holder of a quitclaim deed is entitled to the same protection as
one under a warranty deed.]
Aiken v. Lane. 92 P.2d 628, 631 (Mont. 1939) citing 23 R.C.L. 242; see also
Alexander. 267 P.2d at 733 ("the fact that [defendant's deed] was quitclaim in
form in nowise precludes them from asserting that they were bona fide purchasers
for a valuable consideration in good faith"); Virginia Highland Civic Assoc, v.
Paces Properties. Inc.. 550 S.E.2d 128,130 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) ("a purchaser who
takes a quitclaim deed without notice and for value is entitled to the protection
which the law affords a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice");
Williams v. McCann. 385 P.2d 788, 791 (Okla. 1963) ("a purchaser under a
quitclaim deed is a bona fide one"); 11 Thompson on Real Property 92.15(c)(3)
(David A. Thomas ed., 1994) ("The prevailing view . . . is that conveyance by
quitclaim deed does not disqualify the grantee from recording act protection.").
The fact that Metro West purchased Parcel G by quitclaim deed has no
bearing on whether Metro West purchased Parcel G in good faith. It is undisputed
that Metro West had no knowledge whatsoever of the County's purported but
unrecorded interest in Parcel G. The Tingeys represented to Metro West's
Solly in 1944.
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predecessor in interest that the Tingey family had continually owned and used
Parcel G for more than a century. [R. at 102, 104-05.] Metro West's predecessor
in interest, with the assistance of a title company, could find nothing in the Utah
County records to conflict with the Tingeys' representations. [R. at 100-03.]
Indeed, the County admits in prior briefing in this case that prior to 1998, Metro
West "would not have found any record connecting the County to Parcel G in Utah
County." [R. at 179.]
Judge Peuler correctly applied Utah's Recording Act and correctly ruled that
Metro West was the rightful owner of Parcel G.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT METRO WEST
PURCHASED PARCEL G IN GOOD FAITH AND WITHOUT
NOTICE OF THE COUNTY'S UNRECORDED INTEREST.
The County additionally argues that even if the Recording Act applies to the

facts of this case, there are disputed issues of material fact which preclude
summary judgment regarding whether Metro West purchased Parcel G in good
faith and without notice of the County's purported but unrecorded interest in Parcel
G. The County is again incorrect.
As an initial matter and as Judge Peuler found, there are no material disputes
of fact in this case. In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Metro West
set forth several numbered paragraphs of undisputed fact. [R. at 83-86.] The
County did not dispute any of Metro West's facts as required by Rule 4-501(2)(B)
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of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and the facts were therefor "deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment." Id. Thus, it is undisputed that
Metro West purchased Parcel G for valuable consideration and without notice of
the County's purported ownership interest. [R. at 100-03,106.] It is further
undisputed that Metro West did not know, based on its inspection of Parcel G and
its inspection of the records in the Utah County Recorder's Office, that the County
had any purported ownership interest in Parcel G. [R. at 100-03,119-20,136-37.]
Finally, it is undisputed that no amount of inspection or investigation of Parcel G
itself or of the records at the Utah County Recorder's Office could have provided
any such notice to Metro West because there simply was no notice of any kind on
Parcel G or in the Utah County Recorder's Office of the County's purported
ownership. [R. at 141-43.]
Despite these undisputed facts, the County claims that Metro West should
somehow have been on inquiry notice of the County's unrecorded interest in Parcel
G, and that Metro West should be penalized because it did not somehow discover
the County's complete failure for over a century to properly record its deed. The
County's claim is not supported law or fact.
In Patel v. Rupp, 195 B.R. 779 (D.Utah 1996), the District Court of Utah, in
a case involving Utah's Recording Act, held that the doctrine of inquiry notice
under Utah law involves a two-step analysis:
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First, the court must determine whether the purchaser is in possession
of facts, or whether inspection of the property would have brought to
the purchaser's attention activity on the property, which would have
reasonably alerted the purchaser to potential claims of any party other
than the grantor or record title holder. If the purchaser has such facts,
or if there is activity on the property reasonably alerting the purchaser
to adverse claims, the purchaser is placed on inquiry notice; and,
under the second step, the purchaser is charged with all knowledge
that a reasonable due diligence investigation would have revealed. A
purchaser's duty to investigate arises only when the purchaser is
placed on inquiry notice under the first prong of the analysis.
Id. at 783-84. Accordingly, "[u]nless there is activity apparent upon inspection
'which would have reasonably alerted' a purchaser of [any adverse claim to the
property], no inquiry need by made." Granada, Inc. v. Cinnamon Ridge. Ltd., 92
B.R. 501, 506 (D.Utah 1988) (applying Utah's doctrine of inquiry notice); see also
Johnson v. Bell. 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 1983) (holding that no "further
investigation" is required where there is no "evidence that there was any activity
on the property at [the time of the conveyance] which would have reasonably
alerted" a party to any potentially adverse claims).
As stated, it is undisputed that at the time Metro West purchased Parcel G
from the Tingeys there was no activity on Parcel G that was in any way adverse to
the Tingey's representations regarding their family's longstanding ownership of
Parcel G as grazing land for livestock. [R. at 102,104-05,134-37.] Because there
was no activity on Parcel G adverse to the Tingeys' claim and certainly no
evidence whatsoever of the County's purported interest, Metro West was not
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placed on inquiry notice and had no duty to further investigate the Tingeys'
representations. "[A] duty to inquire is not a duty to disbelieve, aggressively
investigate, and set straight." Diversified Equities. Inc. v. American Savings &
Loan Assoc, 739 P.2d 1133,1137 n. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
It is also undisputed that when Metro West purchased Parcel G in 1987,
there were no records in Utah County connecting Parcel G to the County. [R. at
141-43.] The County did not record its interest in Parcel G until 1998. The
County argues, however, that Metro West had a duty to inquire beyond the Utah
County records and search the records of Salt Lake County or the Bureau of Land
Management to determine if there were any interests in Parcel G adverse to the
Tingeys. The law imposes no such duty on Metro West.
Section 57-3-101, of Utah's Recording Act specifically states that transfers
of real property must be "recorded in the office of the recorder of the county
where the property is located." (emphasis added). To that end, courts have
repeatedly held that recording a deed in the wrong county imparts no notice to a
subsequent purchaser. See, e^g., Stringer v. Young. 28 U.S. 320 (1830) (holding
that recording a deed in a "wrong county" is "fatal"); Honaker Lumber Co.. Inc. v.
Kiser. 113 S.E.718,722 (Va. 1922) (holding that where a deed was recorded in the
wrong county, a subsequent purchaser for value had no notice and "held legal title
to the land"); Havs v. Pumphrev. 125 S.W. 1109, 1111 (Mo. 1910) ("the record of
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a deed only imparts notice to subsequent purchasers when the deed is recorded in
the county where the land is situate").
The County argues that because the Utah County records purportedly do not
indicate that the Tingeys held clear title to Parcel G (despite the fact that there is no
evidence in the Utah County records of any party holding any claim to Parcel G
adverse to the Tingeys), Metro West was on inquiry notice to look beyond the Utah
County records to other sources in an attempt to somehow find the County's
mistake. This, again, is not the law.

In its brief, the County, in hindsight, nit-picks at things it apparently believes
Metro West could have done to somehow discover the County's mistake and then
claims that Metro West is not a good faith purchaser because it did not do these
things. For example, the County claims that Metro West was not a good faith
purchaser because it did not retain a lawyer to assist in its purchase of Parcel G.
[Appellant's Brief at 18.] While we as lawyers may believe we are indispensable
in every business deal, we are not. Parties may still enter into a business deal
without the aid of an attorney and doing so does not indicate bad faith or lack of
diligence. The County also claims that Metro West did not obtain the aid of a
professional title company in purchasing Parcel G. [Id.] This is simply false. It is
undisputed that Metro West purchased Parcel G with the assistance of a title
company and the title company conducted a review of the records and reported no
conflicts with the Tingey's representations and certainly reported no indication of
any ownership interest by the County. [R. at 102-03.] Indeed, the County has
admitted that prior to 1998, Metro West "would not have found any record
connecting the County to Parcel G in Utah County." [R. at 179.] The County's
attempt to pass the blame to Metro West through its after-the-fact quibbling about
what Metro West did or did not do is misplaced where the undisputed facts make
clear that there was no indication whatsoever of the County's purported ownership
interest either on the property itself or in the Utah County Recorder's Office at the
time Metro West purchased Parcel G. If the County had simply followed Utah law
and recorded its purported interest, Metro West would have been put on notice and
22

In First American Title Insurance Co. v. J.B. Ranch, 966 P.2d 834 (19981
the defendant argued that the plaintiff should have been on inquiry notice of
potentially adverse claims because although there was no record in the county
recorder's office, public mapsfiledwith the county clerk indicated roads crossing
the subject property. The Court entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff
title company, holding repeatedly that the plaintiff was not on inquiry notice
because "inquiry notice arises from knowledge of certain facts and circumstances,
not from records." Id at 838 (emphasis added). The Court further held that
although the maps were filed with the county clerk, they would not impart
constructive notice because they were not filed with the county recorder's office.
The Court stated, "[t]he salutariness of the recording statute is that it provides
stability and certainty to land titles on which purchasers must rely." Id. at 839.
In First American Title, the Utah Supreme Court also distinguished a case
relied upon by the County, Salt Lake. Garfield & West Railway v. Allied Materials
Co.. 291 P.2d 883 (Utah 1955). In Allied Materials, a railroad company claimed a
right-of-way over the defendant's land. Although the actual deed was not
recorded, there was a subsequent deed in the defendant's chain of title that made
reference to the earlier deed. Moreover, "there were railroad poles, guy wires, and

this dispute would not exist. Metro West should not be punished for the County's
complete failure.
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trolley wires that encroached upon the defendant's land." Id. at 884. On the basis
of these facts, the Court held that the defendant was on inquiry notice of the
railway's claim. Id at 886. The Court in First American Title, stated that "Allied
Materials shows that inquiry notice arises from knowledge of certain facts and
circumstances [i.e. encroachments and activities on the property], not from
records:' 996 P.2d at 838 (emphasis added).
As stated, it is undisputed that there were no activities on Parcel G or
documents in the Utah County Recorder's Office that were in any way adverse to
the Tingey's representations to Metro West and certainly no activities or
documents indicating that the County had any purported interest in Parcel G.
Metro West was not put on inquiry notice of any adverse claim or interest to Parcel
G and was under no duty to inquire beyond the property and the Utah County
Recorder's Office. The simple fact is, if the County had followed Utah law and
properly recorded its deed, this dispute would not exist. Metro West should not be
punished and the County rewarded for the County's clear failure. As a bona fide
purchaser for value, as the party who exclusively used the property and paid all
taxes on the property for nearly a decade, Metro West is entitled to the protection
of Utah's Recording Act and is the rightful owner of Parcel G.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON
THE ALTERNATIVE GROUND THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACTS
DEMONSTRATE METRO WEST OBTAINED PARCEL G
THROUGH ADVERSE POSSESSION.
Even if this Court were to hold that the trial court incorrectly ruled that

Metro West is therightfulowner of Parcel G pursuant to Utah's Recording Act, the
Court should nevertheless uphold the trial court's grant of summary judgment in
Metro West's favor on the alternative ground that Metro West obtained Parcel G
through adverse possession. In Utah, "[i]t is well-settled that an appellate court
may affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though the trial court
relied on some other ground." DeBrv v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428,444 (Utah 1995); see
also Dipoma v. McPhie. 1 P.3d 564, 566 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (an appellate court
"may affirm a lower court's ruling on any alternative ground even though that
ground or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its ruling")
(internal quotations omitted). The issue of adverse possession was fully briefed
and presented to the trial court. As set forth below, Metro West has met the
statutory elements of adverse possession under Utah law and is therightfulowner
of Parcel G.
A.

Metro West Has Established the Elements of Adverse Possession.

Under Utah law, a party who occupies and possesses property under a claim
of title based on a written instrument for a continuous period of seven years and
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pays all taxes assessed on the property during that period is deemed to have
adversely possessed the property. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-8, 12.4
Section 78-12-9 of the Utah Code states that property is deemed to have
been possessed where it has been "usually cultivated or improved" or where "it has
been used" . . . "for the ordinary use of the occupant." The Utah Supreme Court
has defined "ordinary use of the occupant" as "use appropriate to location and
character of property." Day v. Steele. 184 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1947). Applying
this standard, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a defendant obtained adverse
possession to a parcel of property where it occupied the property by allowing its
sheep to openly graze "for a period of about three weeks each year" for sufficient
years under the statute. Cooper v. Carter Oil Co.. 316 P.2d 320, 322 (Utah 1957).
Metro West has met each of the elements of adverse possession. After
acquiring Parcel G in 1989, Metro West paid all taxes assessed on the property
until it sold the property in 1999. [R. at 114-15,145-57.] In 1989, Metro West
incorporated Parcel G into its adjoining land and thereafter used the entire tract of
land exclusively as part of Metro West's gravel pit operation. [R. at 108-13,11618, 121-26.] At all times, Parcel G was exclusively controlled by Metro West and
was held out to the public as a part of Metro West's ongoing gravel pit operation.
4

A copy of the relevant sections of the Utah Code on adverse possession are
attached as an Addendum to this brief.
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[R. at 145-47.] Beginning in 1990 and continuing thereafter, Metro West
improved Parcel G by bulldozing numerous access roads across the property and
excavating and drilling numerous holes on Parcel G and conducting regular sample
testing of the underground materials. [R. at 108-13,116-18,121-26.]
As set forth above, in response to the fact section in Metro West's Motion
for Summary Judgment the County failed to set forth a statement of facts it claims
are in dispute as Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration
requires. Accordingly, Metro West's properly supported facts should be deemed
admitted for purposes of summary judgment and this appeal. Those facts establish
the statutory elements of adverse possession and make clear that Metro West is the
rightful owner of Parcel G.5
B.

Parcel G Was Not Designated for Public Use.

In its opposition to Metro West's Motion for Summary Judgment, the
County argued that Metro West could not have obtained Parcel G through adverse
In its opposition memorandum below, the County briefly referenced two
cases - Day v. Steele, 184 P.2d 216 (Utah 1947) and Riter v. Cayias, 431 P.2d 788
(Utah 1967) - as apparently analogous cases where Utah courts refused to find
adverse possession. In both cases, however, the court specifically found that the
use by the party seeking adverse possession was not exclusive. For example, in
Day, the court found that third parties regularly stored junk on the property,
camped on the property, and generally used the property as a right of way such that
there was no notice that any party was claiming ownership of the property. 184
P.2d at 219-20. See also Riter, 431 P.2d at 789 (plaintiff failed to show "exclusive
possession and/or use of the land"). It is undisputed in this case that Metro West
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possession because Utah law prohibits the adverse possession of public lands.
Section 78-12-13 of the Utah Code provides that a party may not adversely possess
government held property that has been "designated for public use." (Emphasis
added). Because Parcel G was never designated for public use, this exception does
not apply in this case.
Section 78-12-13 specifically requires that government owned land sought to
be exempt from adverse possession be designated for public use. In Pioneer
Investment & Trust Co. v. Board of Education of Salt Lake City. 99 P. 150 (Utah
1909), the Court considered whether land previously used for a public school could
be adversely possessed when the land's use as a public school was discontinued.
The Court examined this issue under Section 2866x, Comp. Law 1907, which
closely mirrors the language of Section 78-12-13. See id at 153. The Court held
that while an exception to adverse possession applies to government entities, "the
exception only applies to property which is devoted to a special public use." Id.
The Court further stated that while government entities "may hold real property not
specifically devoted to public use," they hold such property "in a capacity not
necessarily governmental" and "[t]o property so held the exception does not
apply." Id. The Court concluded that since the property was no longer used for a

continually and exclusively used Parcel G as part of its ongoing gravel pit
operation. [R. at 108-13,116-18,121-26.]
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specific public purpose, and had not been for a number of years, the property could
be adversely possessed. Id.
The County has not, and cannot, produce any evidence that Parcel G has
been dedicated to any public use. Indeed, the County's 30(b)(6) witness, Roger
Hillam, testified that the only thing he could recall regarding the property was that
in 1998 (after the relevant time period) the County conducted "very" preliminary
discussions about some type of trail system but that "[n]othing took place." [R. at
288-291.] Because Parcel G has never been dedicated for public use, section 7812-13 simply does not apply.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the trial court's decision
granting summary judgment in Metro West's favor.
DATED this 3Qr* day of November, 2001.
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE

Bv: HU fL rt
Majk F. James
Mark R. Clements
MarkH. Richards
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Addendum

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS

78-12-8

78-12-8. Under written instrument or judgment.
Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those under whom he claims,
entered into possession of the property under claim of title, exclusive of other
right, founding such claim upon a written instrument as being a conveyance of
the property in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a competent court,
and that there has been a continued occupation and possession of the property
included in such instrument, decree or judgment, or of some part of the
property under such claim, for seven years, the property so included is deemed
to have been held adversely, except that when the property so included consists
of a tract divided into lots, the possession of one lot is not deemed a possession
of any other lot of the same tract.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-8.
Cross-References. — Marketable record
title, § 57-9-1 et seq.

Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Commencement of running of statute.
— Invasion of true owner's rights.
— Minors.
Cotenants.
— Exclusion.
Exclusiveness of statutory methods.
"Open" and "continuous" possession.
— Blacksmith shop.
Interruption.
Written instrument.
-Deed.
Description therein.
Quitclaim deed.
Tax deed.
— Mortgage.
— Sales contract.
Performance of conditions.
Commencement of running of statute.
— Invasion of true owner's rights.
In action for possession of land, statute of
limitations does not begin to run until true
owner's right of possession has been so invaded
as to give rise to cause of action so that where
true owner's right to possession of land had not
been so disturbed or encroached upon, statute
did not begin to run. Scott v. Hansen, 18 Utah
2d 303, 422 P.2d 525 (1966).
— Minors.
Seven-year period for adverse possession began to run upon delivery of the so-called guardian's deed executed after the wards attained
their majority. Memmott v. Bosh, 520 P.2d 1342
(Utah 1974).

Cotenants.
— Exclusion.
This statute does not run between cotenants
unless and until there is manifested a determination on the part of one in possession to
exclude the other cotenants. Memmott v. Bosh,
520 R2d 1342 (Utah 1974).
Exclusiveness of statutory methods.
Statutory methods of acquiring title by adverse possession, set out in former §§ 104-2-7
to 104-2-12, were held to be exclusive. Jenkins
v. Morgan, 113 Utah 534, 196 P.2d 871 (1948).
"Open" and "continuous" possession.
— Blacksmith shop.
Evidence held to show that possession of lot
by defendant as yard in connection with his
blacksmith shop was of continuous and open
character required by statute for title by possession under color of title. Bingham Livery &
Transf. Co. v. McDonald, 37 Utah 457,110 P. 56
(1910).
Interruption.
Where defendant, in possession of lot used as
yard in connection with his blacksmith shop,
permitted teamsters, peddlers, and others who
had occasion to do so to use it as campground
when such usage did not interfere with his own
use and occupation of lot, held, occasional driving over ground used as yard in going to and
coming from barn was not interference with, or
interruption of, defendant's adverse possession.
Bingham Livery & Transf. Co. v. McDonald, 37
Utah 457, 110 P. 56 (1910).

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS

78-12-9

78-12-9. What constitutes adverse possession under written instrument.
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any person
claiming a title founded upon a written instrument or a judgment or decree,
land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases:
(1) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
(3) Where, although not inclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel,
or of fencing timber, for the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or for
the ordinary use of the occupant.
(4) Where a known farm or single lot has been partly improved, the
portion of such farm or lot that may have been left not cleared or not
inclosed according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining county
is deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the part
improved and cultivated.
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-9.
Cross-References. — Agricultural Code,
Title 4.

Marketable record title, § 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Ancient, unrecorded deed.
Applicability of section.
— Easement by prescription.
Efficacy of section.
Evidence of adverse possession.
— Sufficient.
Exclusiveness of statutory methods.
Grazing.
— Grazing season.
Suitable lands.
Use part of year.
— Prima facie case.
Inclosure or occupancy.
Invalid tax deed.
— Actual possession.
Notice to owner.
"Ordinary use of the occupant."
— Holding land for speculation.
— Not found.
"Substantial inclosure."
— Found.
"Usually cultivated or improved."
Cited.
Ancient, unrecorded deed.
One claiming under ancient deed never recorded, and over thirty years' adverse possession of land, during which improvements were
made and taxes paid, established title as
against one claiming under deed from heirs and
administrator of grantor's estate, but never

delivered, which was based upon assumption
that title was still in grantor at time of his
death, and who paid no taxes, never held possession, and claimed no rights in land until just
prior to filing suit to quiet title. Perry v. Perry,
67 Utah 45, 245 P. 695 (1926).
Applicability of section.
— Easement by prescription*
This section does not apply to private rights
of way or to any other class of easement by
prescription. It can only be applied by analogy.
Where a person opens a way for the use of his
own premises, and another person uses it also
without causing damage, the presumption is, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that
such use by the latter was permissive, and not
under claim of right. Harkness v. Woodmansee,
7 Utah 227, 26 R 291 (1891).
Efficacy of section.
The statute defining what shall constitute
adverse possession is of same degree of efficacy
as is the statute of frauds. Tripp v. Bagley, 74
Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R. 1417 (1928).
Evidence of adverse possession.
— Sufficient.
Where plaintiffs asserted title by written
instrument and adverse possession, evidence
that plaintiffs and their predecessors had paid
all taxes for over thirty years and that the

78-12-12

JUDICIAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. JUT, 2d. — 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse
Possession §§ 28 to 38.
C.J.S. — 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 30 et
seq.
A.L.R. — Adverse possession based on encroachment of building or other structure, 2
A.L.R.3d 1005.
Grazing of livestock or gathering of natural

crop as fulfilling traditional elements of adverse possession, 48 A.L.R.3d 818.
Use of property by public as affecting acquisition of title by adverse possession, 56
A.L.R.3d 1182.
Key Numbers. — Adverse Possession ®=> 19
to 21.

78-12-12. Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid.
In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the
provisions of any section of this code, unless it shall be shown that the land has
been occupied and claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and that
the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have been
levied and assessed upon such land according to law.
History: L. 1951, ch- 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-12.
Compiler's Notes. — This section is identical to former § 104-2-12 (Code 1943) which was
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. Section
104-2-12 was also amended by Laws 1951, ch.
19, § 1; that provision is compiled as § 78-12-

12.1 herein. The Supreme Court held the
amendment was valid despite the repeal of
§ 104-2-12.
Cross-References. — Marketable record
title, § 57-9-1 et seq.
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq.
Tax sales, § 59-2-1303 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Adverse possession.
Applicability of section.
Boundary by agreement.
Boundary dispute.
Burden of proof.
Construction.
Continuous possession.
Cotenants.
Evidence.
Exclusiveness of statutory methods.
Fence.
Grantee.
Life estates.
Occupation.
Payment of taxes.
Pleadings.
Prescription.
Public domain.
Running of statutory time limitation.
Surface and mining claims.
Tacking.
Water.
A d v e r s e possession.
Where claimant under claim of ownership
went into actual possession of certain lots

commenced to improve them, subsequently receiving deed from county, held possession was
adverse, from time of entry, as to all the world
except county. Welner v. Stearns, 40 Utah 185,
120 P. 490, 1914C Ann. Cas. 1175 (1911).
Open, notorious and hostile use and possession of the property and payment of taxes
thereon, all under claim of right, will constitute
adverse possession. Mansfield v. NefiF, 43 Utah
258, 134 P. 1160 (1913).
Where defendant and his predecessors had
been in actual, open, and adverse possession of
land for statutory period, and for seven successive years had paid taxes thereon, and they
were inclosed, occupied, and cultivated, title
was acquired by adverse possession. Pacific
Land & Water Co. v. Hartsough, 50 Utah 581,
168 P. 552 (1917).
Applicability of section.
This section does not apply to rights of way or
to any other class of easement by prescription.
It can only be applied by analogy. Harkness v.
Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291 (1891).
Where one claiming by adverse possession,
before seven years necessary for such possession had run, commenced suit to quiet title
against one claiming interest in land, held
T%iain+iflr ranld avail himself of statute as

Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq.
Tax sales, § 59-2-1303 et seq.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Tax title.
— Claim of right.
Judgment was properly entered for defendants in a declaratory judgment action to determine rights of parties to realty possessed by
defendants under tax deed where plaintiffs had
not been in possession of the realty for more
than twelve years prior to the bringing of the

action and had not paid any taxes thereon since
1932 and defendants held possession under an
apparent claim of right adversely to plaintiffs
for more than seven years by grazing sheep
thereon, the validity of the tax deed being
immaterial. Cope v. Bountiful Livestock Co., 13
Utah 2d 20, 368 P.2d 68 (1962).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Utah's
Short Statutes of Limitation for Tax Titles: The
Continuing Specter of Lyman v. National Martgage Bond Corp. — A Need for Remedial Legislation, 1976 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 457.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse
Possession § 165 et seq.

C.J.S. — 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 138;
85 C.J.S. Taxation §§ 984, 985.
Key Numbers. — Adverse Possession «=»
79(4); Taxation «=» 805(4).

78-12-13. Adverse possession of public streets or ways.
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands held
by any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof, designated for
public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, or for any
other public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for any length of time
whatsoever, unless it shall afi&rmatively appear that such town or city or
county or the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or otherwise disposed of,
and conveyed such real estate to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and
that for more than seven years subsequent to such conveyance the purchaser,
his grantees or successors in interest, have been in the exclusive, continuous
and adverse possession of such real estate; in which case an adverse title may
be acquired.
History: L- 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-12-13.
Cross-References. — Dedication of streets,
§ 57-5-4.

Disposal of unused rights of way, § 27-12-97.
Highways continue until abandoned, § 2712-90.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Establishment of a holding by city.
— Insufficient.
Establishment of a holding by drainage district.
Estoppel.
— Affirmative acts.
— Denied.
Establishment of a holding by city.
— Insufficient*
The city must have some semblance of title,

possession or right to use, and making a survey,
destruction of a fence between the street and
adjoining property, and verbal assertion of ownership by the city are not sufficient to establish
a holding. Gibbons v. Salt Lake City Corp., 6
Utah 2d 219, 310 P.2d 513 (1957).
Establishment of a holding by drainage
district.
The evidence indicated that land held by the
Utah County Drainage District Number 1 was
for public use and, therefore, could not be
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